An important regulatory process in the development of behavior is cognition. However, cognition as a blanket term is far too broad to be useful. Rather, specific types of cognition need to be examined separately. One proposal is that one type of human reasoning evolved in a social context, to solve social problems. Here, we report two experiments that use autism to test a prediction from that theory: that social intelligence should be independent of nonsocial intelligence. Autism was chosen because deficits in social reasoning ("theory of mind") are well known. The question we tested was whether their theory of mind deficit was dissociable from abstract and relational reasoning ability. In particular, we expected that the abnormalities in the behavioral development of children with autism would be regulated by abnormalities in theory of mind reasoning rather than other forms of reasoning. Children with autism and matched controls were given tests of abstracting reasoning, which did not involve mental state understanding. Results showed that children with autism performed comparably to the control groups, both on a test of transitive inferential reasoning and on a test of analogical reasoning. These results lend support to the specificity of the theory of mind hypothesis for autism and to Cosmides' theory of the evolution of social intelligence. They also show that cognition as a regulatory process in development needs to be examined in highly specific ways.
Cognition as a Regulatory Process of Behavior
The idea that behavioral development is regulated by a variety of processes (both external and internal) is not new. Some of these regulatory processes are explored in this special issue of Development and Psychopathology. In this article we focus on the idea of cognition being one major (internal) regulatory process and address the question of whether highly specific forms of cognitive deficit might regulate the development of specific forms of psychopathology. We contrast social versus nonsocial intelligence, and examine where the childhood psychiatric disorder of autism is more closely associated with disturbances in social cognition or with cognition more broadly. We begin by introducing the notion of social intelligence.
Social intelligence
In 1989, Cosmides put forward a bold theory, that human intelligence had evolved primarily to solve social problems arising in a social context. She reported data showing that when normal adult participants are given tests of logical reasoning, using the classic Wason 4 card problems, performance is massively facilitated when the problems are set in a social context of ex-change and deception. The Wason Task term "theory of mind" is defined as the gives the subject four cards. Each card has ability to attribute the range of intentional a p or a p ' on one side, and a q or a q' on states (beliefs, intentions, desires, etc.) to the other. The participant is given the four agents, by way of explaining and predicting cards showing: p, p ' , q, and q' and is an agents's actions (Dennett, 1978 ; Premack asked which cards s/he needs to turn over & Woodruff, 1978) . The majority of chilto identify violations to the rule "If p, then dren with autism fail classic theory of mind q." Normal participants perform rather tasks, despite having chronological and verpoorly, turning over cards that are not rele-bal mental ages well above the normal revant to the rule. That is, they turn over p quirement for success (Baron-Cohen, Lesand q \ even though these are not relevant lie, & Frith, 1985; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992;  see to the task. However, when given social Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, rules of the same logical complexity, such 1993 for a review). Because much of normal as "If a person buys alcohol, then s/he must social and communicative functioning rebe over 18 years of age," normal partici-quires a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, pants are very good at checking for viola-1988), this finding has led researchers to tions to the rule in a logical manner. They state that social and communicative probturn over a card of a person aged less than lems characteristic of autism may be due to 18, to see if they are drinking alcohol, or a the inability to understand that mental card showing a glass of alcohol to see if states underlie and drive behavior, they are under 18. They never turn over a However, a common factor in many theglass of Coke®, or a card showing someone ory of mind tasks is that they require the over 18, because these have no social conse-participant to employ complex reasoning, quences.
The participant has to work out a logical The idea that social intelligence may have relation between the events that s/he perevolved independently from nonsocial intel-ceives, and then draw a conclusion based ligence is not entirely new. Jolly (1966) on that relation. Take, for example, the made a similar claim, as did Humphrey classic False Belief Task (Baron-Cohen et (1976) . Indeed, Humphrey called our spe-al., 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) . In this cies "Homo psychologies" to emphasize task, Sally puts her marble in the red box, this point. More recently, Byrne and Whiten but while she is out, Anne moves it to the (1988) coined the phrase "Machiavellian In-blue box. When Sally returns, the particitelligence" to refer to the primate capacity pant is asked "Where does Sally think her to outwit conspecifics and predators, high-marble is?" The subject has to reason that lighting the social-cognitive factors that ap-Sally didn't see her marble being moved, pear to regulate much primate behaviour, therefore she won't know its new location: (This history is reviewed in Baron-Cohen, the blue box. In principle, then, a partici-1995.) pant could fail theory of mind tasks because In this article, we report two experiments of being unable to reason about relations, that test Cosmides* general thesis further. On the other hand, if the theory of mind We use autism as a test case of whether impairment in autism is specific, then chusocial and nonsocial intelligence may be dren with autism should have no problems independent of one another. Autism is a on abstract logical reasoning tasks that do severe childhood psychiatry disorder arising not require reference to mental states. This from some form of brain abnormality, itself is another way of approaching the question probably a result of genetic factors (Folstein about which aspects of cognition are regu- & Rutter, 1988) . Autism is chosen on the lating the development of autism: social or grounds that a large body of experimental nonsocial aspects?
. work has shown that autistic individuals This study explored reasoning ability in are impaired in the development and em-children with autism, and matched controls, ployment of a theory of mind. Here, the in two different domains: logical and ana-logical reasoning. The first task (logical rea-hypothesis predicted that reasoning about soning) tested transitive inference, and was mental states would be selectively impaired based on the seminal study by Bryant and in autism, while "non-mentalistic" relaTrabasso (1971). The second task (analogi-tional reasoning would be largely intact, cal reasoning) was based on the method pioneered by Goswami and Brown (1989) . m , A . ,
These tasks were chosen because both require reasoning of an abstract nature (i.e., n 4' • . u * i .
• \ J * • Participants reasoning about relations) yet do not involve mental state attribution. Also, both Three groups of children took part in the tasks have been demonstrated to be within study. The first was a group of 17 children the ability of normally developing children with autism, all of whom met the estabaround 4 years of age, the age at which lished criteria for autism (American Psychichildren demonstrate success with tradi-atric Association, 1987; Rutter, 1978) . tional theory of mind tasks. Thus, these These subjects were all attending special reasoning tasks do not require the subjects schools for autism in the London area. The to perform above the developmental level second group comprised 15 children with tapped by tests of theory of mind. A final moderate mental handicap, attending spereason for selecting these tasks derives from cial schools for mental handicap in Norfolk, their structure. In the transitive inference The third was a group of 17 normally develtasks, participants have to reason logically oping children, all attending a primary about relations between items (A > B, B school in Norfolk.
The two clinical groups were matched on In the analogical reasoning tasks, partici-verbal mental age (VMA), calculated using pants have to reason logically about higher the Test of Reception of Grammar (TROG; order relations between items (A is to B as Bishop, 1983) , which is held to give a clearer C is t D-or, in the standard notion A:B:: estimate of language comprehension than a C:D). Given that the theory of mind tasks simple vocabulary test. They were also as require reasoning about psychological rela-closely matched as possible for chronologitions (between people), this study allowed cal age (CA). Their details are summarized us to test if the difficulty for children with in Table 1 . autism on theory of mind tasks was due to relational reasoning per se. ^
Qnd dure
In summary, the experiments reported here were designed to further our under-AH children received both tests, in a counstanding of two important areas: the nature terbalanced order. The children were seen of intelligence, and the nature of autism, individually, in a quiet room of their school. Regarding the first of these, we predicted The two tests are described next: that if social intelligence has evolved independently of nonsocial intelligence, then Test 1-Transitive inference. The experichildren with autism may be relatively un-menter first showed the child some drawings impaired on pure tests of abstract and rela-of pairs of objects, where one was always tional reasoning. Regarding the second of longer than the other, and asked the child these, we tested two hypotheses about the "Which is the longest x?", (pencil, for examnature of autism: The relational reasoning pie). The questioning was done to ensure hypothesis predicted that children with au-that all the children understood the term tism would show deficits in performance on "longest." all three tasks (relative to controls) if their
The experimenter then showed the subtheory of mind deficit was a consequence of ject the transitive inference equipment a more generat underlying deficit in abstract (which consisted of an upright, black reasoning. In contrast, the theory of mind wooden block containing five rods of the same diameter, but which differed in color, told the child which was the longest after All five rods protruded 1" from the block, the child had made a choice, and the pairbut were actually all different lengths, thus ings were repeatedly presented until the it was impossible for the children to tell child could consistently pick the longest rod from looking which rods were longer). The each time. experimenter told the subject that s/he was In the test phase, the experimenter pregoing to play a game where s/he had to try sented to the child 10 pairings of rods, 6 of to work out which rod was the longest. 1 which required an inference (AC,AD, The transitive inference equipment was then AE,BD,DE,CE) and 4 of which only reremoved from sight. quired memory (e.g., AB). During this The task had two phases. In the training phase the experimenter did not give any phase, the experimenter showed the child feedback concerning the lengths of the rods, the transitive inference equipment contain-The child was given each test pairing once ing two adjacent rods, and asked him/her only, in random order, to point to the one s/he thought was the Scoring. We set a conservative criterion longest. Participants were not allowed to of passing this test-defined as passing 6 take the rods out and had no visible way or more pairings out of 10. This number of telling which rod was the longest, because was chosen because it would be significantly all rods protruded an equal amount from betterthanchance. For any one pair, chance the block. The only visible difference be-equals p = 0.5. Thus, passing six trials by tween the rods was that each was a different chance would have the small probability of color. After the child had made a decision, p = 0.0156). the experimenter said "Well done! Yes, the (color of rod) rod is the longest" or "That's , m . a good try, but the (color of rod) rod is the Tests 2-Analogical reasoning. This task longest," depending on whether the child h a d t w o conditions. Children received one of these m a first session and *" °t h e r chose correctly or not. The transitive infero f t h e s e m a f i r s t s e s s i o n a n d * " °t h e r ence equipment was then removed from i n a s e c o n d s e s s i o n (approximately 2 days sight, and the pairing of rods was changed I a t e r ) ; The order of presentation was counto the next pairing before being presented terbalanced across participants Before the again to the child. During the training phase t a s k s t a r t e d t h e experimenter told the child the child was shown the rods in pairings t h a t s / h e w a s 8 0in S t 0 P Ia * a g a m e w h , subject would understand. For simplicity, they will all been affected in the same way (e.g., be referred to as "rods" here. pictures of things that had all been cut into pieces). The experimenter placed these three something had happened to it. For example, pictures in front of the child, one at a time, the first picture might be a Playdough encouraging the child to name each picture sausage (A), and the second picture the as it was placed to ensure that s/he recog-same Playdough sausage but cut into nized what was depicted. When the pictures pieces (B). The third picture then showed had been named, the experimenter re-an apple in its normal state (C), and the minded the child that they had to choose fourth slot was left empty for the child to the picture that would make a pattern with complete the sequence, those already laid out. Five choice picture cards were presented The experimenter then laid out five to the subject, only one of which depicted choice pictures one at a time, in a random the analogical solution (e.g., an apple that order, below the first three pictures. Again, had been cut into pieces (D)). The other the child was encouraged to name the pic-four choice pictures were distractors that tures as they were presented. One of these were related to (C) in some other way. These pictures was the correct choice, because it were: a correct causal change, but on the depicted the instrument that caused what wrong object (E), the correct object but with was shown in the first three pictures (e.g., the wrong causal change (F), a perceptually a knife, which would be used to cut things similar object (G), and a semantically reup). The other four pictures depicted instru-lated object (H). As in the causal reasoning ments that were irrelevant to the causal control condition there were eight trials (see change. There were eight sets of these causal Appendix 2). The five choice cards were patterns, and were presented to all eight presented in random order, children (see Appendix 1).
The child was encouraged to name the Once the children had chosen the picture pictures as the experimenter laid them out, that they thought would make a pattern, and after selecting a picture to make a patthey were then asked to justify their choice, tern the subject was again asked to justify This was to ensure that there was some his/her choice. The justifications were rereasoning behind the choice, rather than corded and analyzed later. As in the causal mere guessing. It also enabled an analysis reasoning control condition, the experiof the kind of reasoning that was being menter followed each trial with an explanaused. The experimenter then said, "Well tion. All participants received all eight done, that's the right picture because. . . . " trials.
In both instances the experimenter ex-
The distractor choices used in the task plained why the choice was correct (e.g., were designed to explore what kinds of er-"because these pictures show things that rors the children were making, and if they have all been cut, and this picture shows consistently made more of certain errors. In a knife which is used to cut things"). An other words, would children tend to make explanation of this kind followed every perceptually related errors (distractor (G)), trial. This condition thus ensured that the or would they tend to choose pictures that children understood the causal relationships depicted the correct object but the wrong depicted.
causal change (distractor (F)), suggesting Analogy condition. In this condition that they understood that something had to children were again shown sets of pictures happen to the object, but could not make and given the same instructions as in the the analogical connection, for example, causal reasoning control condition. HowFinally, the causal reasoning control conever, in this condition the first three pictures dition was included to check the children's were not laid out together in a line. Instead, causal knowledge and provide some trainthe first two were placed as a pair, with a ing in this if it was less than perfect, space before the third picture. These picScoring. As before, we defined a consertures showed an object that was in its nor-vative criterion of passing the analogical mal state, and then the same object after reasoning test, defined in terms of passing at 1985) . In this task, the child watches the passing at least 6 out of 10 test questions experimenter enact a short story using two (Autism x Normal, x 2 = 2.55, p -0.11; dolls, Sally and Anne: Sally hides her mar-Autism x Mental handicap, x 2 = 0-04, p ble in the red box and then goes out for a = 0.85; Mental handicap x Normal, x 2 = walk. Anne moves the marble to the blue 1.77, p = 0.18). When the critical BDinferbox; then Sally re-enters, and the subject is ential question was examined (this being asked "Where does Sally think the marble the one question that Bryant and Trabasso is?" Control questions for this include a (1971) argue to be truly inferential), again memory question ("Where was the marble there was no significant difference between in the beginning?") and a reality question groups in their pass rates (Autism x Nor-("Where is the marble really?"). Two trials mal, x 2 = 1.62, p = 0.1; Autism X Menwere administered, varying the hiding loca-tal handicap, x 2 = 0.06, p = 0.75; Mental tiohs each time, and a pass was scored if handicap x Normal, x 2 = 2.17, p = 0.1. the child passed on both trials, as well as Thus, children with autism do not show any on the control questions. deficit in their ability to perform transitive inferential reasoning of this kind.
Results

Analogical reasoning test Transitive inference test
^u-u n ,u r A J Children across all three groups performed AH children across groups passed the con-virtually at ceiling in the causal reasoning trol questions concerning the meaning of control condition of this task (Autism: 949b the term "longest." Therefore all children pass, Mental handicap: 93.3% pass, Norwere given the transitive inference task. Ta-mal: 1009b) , showing that children underble 2 illustrates the percentages of children stood the causal relationships that underlay in each group who passed six or more test the analogy trials. In the analogy condition, questions and also the percentage of chil-because the subjects had to choose the cordren in each group who failed two or more rect analogical solution out of a choice of memory questions. There was no significant five distractors, the probability of a correct choice by chance on any one trial was p = relational reasoning. The relational reason-0.2. Passing more than two out of the eight ing hypothesis was clearly refuted: children trials overall would also be above chance (/? with autism were comparable to match con-< 0.04). The percentage of children passing trols on both logical (inferential) and anatwo or more trials (up to those passing all logical reasoning. The deficit in autism five out of eight trials), is shown in Table 3 . then, appears to be specifically related to
The children with autism performed well psychological reasoning. This is strong supabove chance on the analogical reasoning, port for the "mindblindness" account of because they showed no significant differ-autism (Baron-Cohen, 1990 . ence in performance for passing five or Frith (1989 Frith ( , 1994 proposed an alternamore trials compared to controls (Autism tive account in terms of "weak central co-X Mental Handicap x 2 = 3.06, p > 0.1; herence." This proposal holds that children Autism x Normal, x 2 = 3.78, p > 0.1). with autism may have a deficit in their abilBecause they still performed above chance, ity to see information as an integrated whole children with autism apparently are capable and instead tend to focus more on the sepaof reasoning by analogy. rate parts. They lack the normal drive for Gestalt perception and, instead of seeing r i i r f f t " t l i e wood but not the trees" (as a normal false Dqtej tasK individual does), they tend to see "the trees Only 4 out of the 17 children with autism but not the wood." Frith (1989) suggested (or 23.5%) passed the theory of mind test, that this lack of strong central coherence compared to 12 out of 15 children with leads to their superior performance on the mental handicap (80%) and 14 out of 17 embedded figures task (Shah & Frith, 1983) , normal children (82.4%). This difference and on block design (Shah & Frith, 1993) , between the autism group and the other as well as explaining their difficulties with two groups is highly significant (Autism x theory of mind tasks. This account would Mental Handicap x 2 = 10.81, df -\,p = predict that they should be less able to make 0.001; Autism x Normal, x 2 -12.77, df relevant connections between pieces of in-= l,p = 0.0004). In contrast, the two con-formation. However, the results of these trol groups did not differ significantly from studies suggest that children with autism each other (Mental Handicap x Normal x 2 ore capable of making relevant connections = 0.08, df = 1, p = 0.78). In the group between several pieces of related informawith autism alone, the proportion passing tion. If there is weak central coherence in the false belief task was significantly lower autism, it is not pervasive, as it does not than those passing either the transitive infer-prevent logical transitive inference, across ence test (McNemar x 2 = 11. lit P < relations, nor a degree of analogical reason-0.001) or the analogical reasoning test (Me-ing about higher order relations. . of mind (ToMM; Leslie, 1987 Leslie, , 1991 Leslie, , 1994 .
u s s l o n As mentioned earlier, the analogical reasonWith regard to understanding the nature ing test involves reasoning about higher orof autism, this study tested two competing der relations. In looking at picture cards hypotheses: (a) that children with autism (A), (B), and (C), there are many possible demonstrate poor performance on theory connections. To complete the analogical of mind tasks because they have a specific pattern, the participant must be able to deficit in understanding mental states; ver-consider the relation between (A) and (B), sus (b) their theory of mind deficit is the and understand that that relation must be result of a more general deficit in abstract represented in relation to that between (C) and (D). Thus, it is not enough to understand the relation between cards (A) and (B) alone, and the relation between (C) and (D) alone. If the participant were unable to represent the higher order relation, then s/he would pair any of the distractors with card (C) randomly, because all five distractor cards are related to card (C) in some way.
Because the children with autism perform well above chance on the analogical reasoning task, this ability to represent higher order relations between stimuli raises questions in relation to Leslie's (1987) and Perner's (1993) theories of the "metarepresentational" deficit in autism. Leslie and Roth (1993) suggested that children with autism are capable of creating primary representations of the world, that is, they can directly represent objects, situations, and real-world scenarios. They also suggested that children with autism are unable to represent an agent's attitude to a proposition (a so-called M-representation). In contrast, Perner (1993) suggested autistic children are unable to represent representations of representations (or "metarepresentations"). One reading of Perner's theory would predict that children with autism should be unable to pass the analogical reasoning task, because this involves representing a higher order relation, which in itself is a representation of the two lower order representations (see Figure 2) .
Our results show evidence of children with autism reasoning with representations of representations, this evidence suggests that the deficit in autism is unlikely to be a general deficit in metarepresentational ability as Perner maintains. Rather, the results are consistent with Leslie's modular view that there is a deficit in the representation of mental states alone. Such a conclusion is consistent with a series of independent studies showing that children with autism can represent nonmental representations such as drawings, photographs, models, and maps (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992, in press; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie < & Thaiss, 1992) while still failing in tasks requiring the representation of mental representations. The results of these experiments take us one step further in suggesting that the cognitive system that is impaired in autism is not involved in logical or analogical reasoning, but appears to be dedicated to psychological reasoning (BaronCohen, 1994 ). This view is consistent with claims by Cosmides (1989) f . turn will determine which aspects of the In closing, we bring out the relevance of environment the child focuses on or is conthe above findings for the topic of this fused by. Further environmental regulators Special Issue. It is often thought that the are likely to act in a secondary fashion, in major regulators of development are either the case of autism, as parents, peers, and environmental (such as poverty, understim-others unwittingly exclude the child with ulation, parental neglect, etc.), or genetic autism from the normal range of opportuni-(e.g., Fragile-X or Down's syndrome), ties for social interaction. In other developHowever, using the approach of develop-mental disabilities, comparable interactions mental cognitive neuropsychology, it can between genes, cognition, and the environbe shown that highly specific cognitive ment might also occur. (Pinker, 1994 , mechanisms also play a key role in develop-makes the case for Specific Language Imment. If a child with autism possesses much pairment fitting this model.) Equally, we of what we have called nonsocial intelli-should expect yet other disabilities in which gence, but lacks aspects of what we have just one of these regulators acts alone, but called social intelligence, this pattern could we hope that studies of the kind reported be expected to lead him or her down a here will serve to ensure specific cognitive very different developmental trajectory to processes are not ignored as important dea child (without autism) who shows the velopmental regulators.
